Fear, populism, and the geopolitical landscape: The "sleeper effect" of neurotic personality traits on regional voting behavior in the 2016 Brexit and Trump votes
In 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU) (a decision known as "Brexit") and Donald J. Trump was elected as President of the United States (US).
The widespread media coverage of the Brexit and Trump campaigns characterized them as being quite unlike other recent campaigns, particularly in their use of so-called populist themes (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Pettigrew, 2017) .
The Brexit and Trump campaigns were different in many ways, but one thing they had in common, according to one popular media narrative, was their focus on stoking fears in the electorate. In Britain, the Vote Leave campaign and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), for example, stoked citizens' worries about immigration and terrorism; the UKIP campaigned to "Take Back Control" from the EU by establishing firm borders to reduce the threats of multiculturalism on economic independence and freedom. In the US, Donald Trump's campaign to "Make America Great Again" followed populist themes and was based on appeals to fear (Nai & Maier, 2018) ; specifically, the campaign appealed to a belief that an influx of immigrants has weakened the nation's values, economy, and security (The Atlantic, 2016) . The fact that such rhetoric resonated with so many voters surprised many people, including political analysts, right up to the moment when the final results were announced.
Even sophisticated forecasting models that used historical voting records and demographic data, predicted victories for the Vote Remain and Clinton campaigns (see, for example, Millward, 2016) . Evidently, the models traditionally used for predicting and explaining political behavior did not capture an essential factor that influenced people's voting decisions in 2016. So how are we to understand the changing geopolitical landscape? What factors might account for the surprising receptivity to this recent emergence of populist campaigns?
Research has long highlighted the role of psychological factors in influencing political ideology and political behavior, including voting behavior in major elections (Avery, Lester, & Yang, 2015; Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, & Fraley, 2007; Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Jost et al., 2003; Pesta & McDaniel, 2014) . In the domain of personality, political orientation (typically defined in terms a liberal vs. conservative continuum) has been linked to the dimensions of the Big Five model (John & Srivastava, 1999) ; in particular, studies point to a moderate to large association between political conservatism and low Openness and a small but reliable association between conservatism and high Conscientiousness (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Jost, 2006; McCrae, 1996; Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012) . Similar findings were revealed by studies undertaken at the regional level (Rentfrow et al., 2013; Rentfrow, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2009 ).
However, the recent populist campaigns, which have played upon voters' fears, point to the possible role of another personality dimension-the one most closely tied to anxiety, anger, and fear, namely Neuroticism (Barlow, Ellard, Sauer-Zavala, Bullis, & Carl, 2014; Digman, 1990; Eysenck, 1947) . In personality research, Neuroticism is usually defined as emotional instability characterized by more extreme and maladaptive responses to stressors and a higher likelihood of negative emotions (e.g., anxiety, anger, and fear). One integrative summary of various conceptions of the Big Five dimensions, characterizes Neuroticism in terms of a reactivity to negative events or stressors and to environmental and social threats (Denissen & Penke, 2008) . This conception of Neuroticism as a lowered threshold for detecting and responding to stimuli as threatening or dangerous, suggests that individuals high on this trait will be more receptive to campaigns, such as populism, which specifically prey on fears of looming threats and dangers. Research shows that once these fears have been activated, they can affect decisions of all kinds, including voting behavior (Alesina & Passarelli, 2015) . As a result, regions higher in Neuroticism should show particularly big swings in the populist directions. As such, we propose that Neuroticism might be responsible for a kind of "sleeper effect," such that, under normal conditions it has no influence, but in certain circumstances (e.g., the rise of populism) it can play a significant role in determining consequential outcomes.
Here we test potential "sleeper effects" of Neuroticism by investigating the links between regional levels of neurotic traits and votes for Brexit and Trump in the 2016 elections.
In particular, we test the hypothesis that regions with high scores on neurotic traits, namely Trait Neuroticism and two sub-facets, Trait Anxiety and Trait Depression (Soto & John, 2009) , are associated with support for Brexit and Trump. We compare the effects of these neurotic traits with those of Openness and Conscientiousness, which are the known regional personality correlates of political orientation and voting behavior. We also control for alternative explanations, namely historical industrial decline (lost pride), political attitude (liberal), education, race, and current economic hardship.
Method
Here we summarize the key elements of the design; for details of the samples, selection procedures, representativeness, challenges to validity, focal variables, and control variables, see Online Supplementary Materials).
Regional level. We conduct our analysis at the county level in the US. In the UK, we analyze the Local Authority District (LAD) level; there we focus only on regions in Scotland, England, and Wales because the control variables are not available for Northern Ireland.
Personality data. The UK personality data (N=417,217) come from a large Internetbased survey designed and administered between 2009 and 2011 in collaboration with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC UK Lab project; see Rentfrow, Jokela, & Lamb, 2015) ; participants were spread across 379 LADs with at least 100 participants in each. The US personality data (N=3,167,041) come from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project, collected between 2003 and 2015 and divided into 2,082 counties, with at least 100 participants in each.
Personality data were collected using the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) . We focus on neurotic traits: Neuroticism as a broad Big Five trait and Anxiety and Depression as established sub-facets of Neuroticism. We aggregated the individual-level scores based on the LAD/county in which the participants lived. We compare the neurotic traits to the role of Openness and Conscientiousness, the established regional personality correlates of voting behavior.
Election data. We focus on two kinds of dependent variables (DVs). The first is the simple vote share for Brexit and Trump, testing the idea that regions high on Neuroticism were particularly likely to be swayed by populist campaigns. This DV mirrors those used in previous analyses and allows us to test whether the 2016 elections differed from previous ones in now showing associations with regional Neuroticism where previous votes had been associated only with regional Openness and Conscientiousness.
The second kind of DV, which we can measure only in the US analyses, focuses on that part of Trump's vote that is not merely due to him being the Republican candidate. In other words, we examine the shift to Trump, over and above the region's historical tendency to vote for Republican candidates. We thus aim at capturing the specific impact (and success) of Trump's populist campaign, with its clearer focus on fears and (potential) losses than seen in previous campaigns (Inglehart & Norris, 2016) . It has been suggested that it was these particular shifts to Trump (e.g., in battlefield states) that lead to his victory (The Washington Post, 2016) . US election data come from open data sources (Github 2017; OpenDataSoft 2016 Control variables. We control for an array of variables which could potentially explain voting behavior.
First, we control for population density because voters in regions with higher population density (e.g. larger cities) tend not to vote for conservative candidates. In the UK analysis, we also included country dummies for Scotland and Wales. Scotland and Wales are special cases because of simmering independence movements and local culture. For example, there are strong economic motives in Scotland to remain in the EU even after a potential independence from the UK because a small country, like Scotland disproportionally gains from free trade in the EU (Schiff, 1997).
Second, we consider the regions' industrial heritage. Recent studies and popular narratives suggest that voters in the industrialized heartlands of the UK and US were particularly likely to vote for Brexit and Donald Trump. One reason could be that the industrialized areas (e.g., the Rust Belt in the US) are in a long phase of decline (Autor et al., 2013; Autor et al., 2017) . One major promise of the Trump campaign was a policy shift away from free trade to protect jobs in the industrialized heartland ("bringing back the manufacturing"). Additionally, popular narratives suggest that the workforce in these industries viewed themselves with a lot of pride and the loss of this pride during the industrial decline might have made them susceptible to populist campaigns (see also Inglehart & Norris, 2016) .
To capture the effect of the historical industrial decline in the old industrial centers, we include the employment share in manufacturing and mining in the US for the year 1970 (M = 25.3%, SD = 11.76) and in the UK for the year 1971 as controls (M = 34.33%, SD = 12.34). We chose data from the early 1970s over later time periods because they provide good estimates of the industrial structure before de-industrialization accelerated from the 1980s onwards.
Third, we consider political attitudes of the regional populace. Prior research has shown that people who consider themselves as liberal tend to vote for left-wing parties and people who consider themselves as conservatives tend to vote for right-wing parties (e.g., Langer & Cohen, 2005) . So here we examine whether neurotic traits add any incremental predictive validity beyond a simple effect of political attitudes. Specifically, we include a control variable reflecting the liberal political attitude of the regional populace (single item: "I see myself as someone who is politically liberal", ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). The individual-level data come from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project in both countries and were aggregated to the corresponding regional levels in the US (M = 2.74, SD = 0.24) and UK (M = 2.97, SD = 0.21).
Fourth, the Trump and Brexit campaigns were reported to stir up racial tensions with regard to migration (e.g., Major, Blodorn, & Blascovich, 2016) and racial composition of the population can predict voting behavior (e.g. Rentfrow et al., 2015; Autor et al., 2017) . We Finally, we also use the educational attainment of the population as a control variable because education can also predict election results (Rentfrow et al., 2013) . We expect educational attainment to be important for two reasons. First, better educated people have profited in the last decades from free trade in terms of better job chances and higher earnings (Autor, 2014) . This makes it more likely that they will vote against Trump and Brexit, which have isolationistic tendencies. Second, populist campaigns may offer simplified solutions to complex problems and better educated people might find these simplified solutions unrealistic and thus vote against these campaigns (Seligson, 2007) . In the US, we use the population share with a bachelor degree or higher. The data come from the 2010 ACS 5yr estimates in the US (M = 21.92%, SD = 9.56). In the UK, we use the population share with NVQ level 4 qualification or above, roughly equivalent to degree level. The data come from the 2011 Census (M = 26.91%, SD = 7.67).
All variables and their sources are reported in Table 1. [ Table 1 about here] Tables 2 and 3 Next, we present OLS regression results for both countries. All variables were zstandardized to ease interpretation of the coefficients. We tested the Neuroticism (or its subfacets) model against the Openness and Conscientiousness model, and also included different sets of control variables (e.g., to consider potential overlap between economic hardship and education levels, which might lead to multicollinearity). We tested six models in each country: The first model included the effects of Neuroticism and of basic controls. The second model included the effects of Openness and Conscientiousness (but not Neuroticism) and the basic controls. The third model included Neuroticism and also Openness and Conscientiousness plus the basic controls. The fourth model added the historical industrial decline (historical industry structure) to control for the "lost pride" effect. The fifth model added political attitudes, race, and current economic hardship. The sixth model replaced economic hardship with education. We also regressed models including economic hardship and education at the same time but the correlation of these control variables was very high, which led to unstable regression results due to multicollinearity. Thus, we do not present a model including all control variables at one time.
Results
All the models throughout the paper were tested using OLS as the regression technique.
Note that in most models the Breusch-Pagan test reveals heteroscedasticity, which biases the tstatistics and leads to erroneous conclusions about statistical significance. To avoid this problem, we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Models 1, 2, and 3 were conducted to evaluate the extent to which regional differences (Table 4 : β = -0.53, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5 : β = -0.29, SE = 0.02, p < 0.01), and Trump gains (Table 6 : β = -0.16, SE = 0.02, p < 0.01). Additionally, Brexit votes were lower in Scottish LADs (Table 4 : β = -0.47, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001) and Welsh LADs (Table 4 : β = -0.13, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001). The results for model 2 indicated that Openness negatively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4 : β = -0.61, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5 : β = -0.43, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), and Trump gains (Table 6 : β = -0.47, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001).
Conscientiousness showed no effect on Brexit votes (Table 4) , but had a small and negative effect on Trump votes (Table 5 : β = -0.08, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) and Trump gains (Table 6 : β = -0.11, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). In model 3, which tested Neuroticism, Openness and Conscientiousness together, the results revealed similar effects for the traits with the exception that the negative effect of Conscientiousness became slightly positive and non-significant in both countries.
Models 4, 5, and 6 represent relatively conservative tests because we not only consider political attitudes (liberal attitudes) but also those regional socio-economic conditions (e.g., historical industry patterns and current economic hardship and education levels) that might be interrelated, and may actually "co-develop" over time, with regional Neuroticism (Obschonka et al., 2017b) . The positive correlations between regional Neuroticism and such control variables (Tables 2 and 3 ) are in line with such an assumption.
The results for model 4 indicated that historical industrial structure had a positive effect on Brexit votes (Table 4 : β = 0.10, SE = 0.04, p < 0.01), Trump votes (Table 5 : β = 0.06, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), and Trump gains (Table 6 : β = 0.09, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001).
Models 5 and 6 include the socio-economic controls capturing race, recent economic hardship, political attitudes, and education levels. In model 5, the liberal political attitude of the regional populace negatively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4 : β = -0.37, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001) and Trump votes (Table 5 : β = -0.69, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001), but positively predicted Trump gains (Table 6 : β = 0.13, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). The differing result of liberal political attitude on Trump votes and gains needs a short explanation. The raw correlation of liberalism and Trump gains is -.3, so the Trump gains were smaller in liberal regions, but the additional control for Openness reversed this relationship so that Trump gains were larger in liberal areas. Among the other control variables in these models, the share of white people positively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4 : β = 0.14, SE = 0.05, p < 0.01), Trump votes (Table 5 : β = 0.44, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001), and Trump gains (Table 6 : β = 0.36, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) in model 5. This effect was no longer significant in model 6 in the UK analysis. Model 5 also revealed that unemployment positively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4 : β = 0.22, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), negatively predicts Trump votes (Table 5 : β = -0.05, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), and did not predict Trump gains (Table   6 : β = 0.04, SE = 0.03, p > 0.05). Earnings, in turn, negatively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4 : (Table 5 : β = -0.11, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001), and
Trump gains (Table 6 : β = -0.29, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001).
Finally, model 6 shows that high education had a negative effect on Brexit votes (Table   4 : β = -0.60, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5 : β = -0.14, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001, and
Trump gains (Table 6 : β = -0.63, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). We observed that the relationship between the Big Five traits in these models on the one side, and Brexit votes, Trump votes, and Trump gains on the other got weaker when successively including more control variables (except for the effect of Conscientiousness).
[Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here] Taken together, the results support the assumption that Neuroticism was positively related to voting behavior in both the Brexit referendum and Trump election. This effect was robust when tested against Openness and Conscientiousness (with only Openness showing a robust effect). The effect of Neuroticism on Brexit votes diminished when socio-economic control variables were included in the analysis, but the effect on support for Trump persisted albeit with smaller effect sizes (β ranging from 0.07 to 0.20 depending on model and DV). We observed similar results when looking at the subfacets of Neuroticism (Anxiety and Depression) (see Table A1 for Brexit votes, A2 for Trump votes, and A3 for Trump gains). We also found indications that historical industrial decline as well as race, liberal attitudes, recent economic hardship, and education levels were related to Brexit votes and Trump votes and gains.
As a robustness check, we tested whether the results changed when the other Big Five traits, Agreeableness and Extraversion, were added to the regressions. These models are shown in Online Appendix Table A4 for Brexit votes and in Table A5 for Trump votes and Trump gains. In general, the effects of Neuroticism and Openness as identified in our main analysis did not change. We also conducted a robustness check regarding the representativeness of the regional samples by weighting the individual observations in the Personality samples by age and gender when computing the regional traits. These results are displayed in Online Appendix Table A6 for both countries. The results do not differ much from our main regression in Tables   1-3 , although the size of the regression coefficients of the traits are slightly reduced in some models.
Discussion
The populist political campaigns of 2016 were widely believed to differ from previous campaigns, particularly in their focus on generating fears and stoking nationalist fervor.
Theoretically, campaigns that draw on fear should be particularly compelling to people already prone to being anxious. Consequently, regions with high numbers of anxious people should be more likely to vote for populist issues (e.g., Brexit) and candidates (e.g., Trump) than regions with lower numbers of anxious people. This logic would suggest that regional levels of Neuroticism-a dimension not previously associated with voting trends-should be associated with support for populist issues and, as a result, influence the geopolitical landscape.
When comparing the effect of neurotic traits to the effects of other Big Five traits (models 1-3 in the regressions), our analyses generally supported this "sleeper effect" prediction. Neurotic traits positively predicted share of Brexit and Trump votes and Trump gains from Romney when controlling for Openness and Conscientiousness. Particularly in the US analyses, many of these effects of neurotic traits persisted in additional tests controlling for regional industrial heritage, political attitude, and socio-economic features. We observed stronger effects of neurotic traits when examining Trump gains (from Romney), compared to the simple share of Brexit and Trump votes, which underscores our initial assumption that it is particularly the shift in voting behavior towards such campaigns addressing fears that reflects the interplay between regional Neuroticism and the success of these campaigns.
One key question remains whether fear can be harnessed by any political campaign or whether it is better suited to some positions or policies than to others. For example, could the Remain campaign in the UK or Hillary Clinton in the US have pursued fear-based populist campaigns as successfully as those pursued by the Leave and Trump campaigns? We do not have any direct evidence to address this question but recent theory and research provides indirect evidence to suggest that campaigns built on fear and threat are better suited to conservative campaigns than liberal ones. Specifically, theoretical work suggests that existential needs to reduce threat are associated with political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and a preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that individuals' subjective perceptions of threat, as well as objectively threatening circumstances, lead to shifts toward conservatism (Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017) . Concomitantly, experimentally increasing individuals' feelings of physical safety leads to shifts away from conservatism (Napier, Huang, Vonasch, & Bargh, in press). In short, the activation of fear in the electorate would seem to be suited more to conservative positions than to liberal positions.
Our study contributes to a wide range of research demonstrating important effects of Neuroticism on various socio-economic outcomes at the individual (Barlow et al., 2014) and regional levels; regional levels of Neuroticism predict lower economic resilience at times of major recession (Obschonka et al., 2016) , low mental and physical health (Rentfrow, Jokela, & Lamb, 2015) , and substantial costs for society (Lahey, 2009 ). An analysis of the concrete economic costs to society (e.g., health-service uptake in primary and secondary mental-health care, out-of-pocket costs, production losses) associated with Neuroticism concluded that they are "enormous and exceed those of common mental disorders" (p. 1086; Cuijperset al., 2010) .
The established associations between regional Neuroticism and so many consequential outcomes raise the question of how the regional differences in Neuroticism and other traits get established in the first place and then maintained over time. A number of mechanisms have been proposed (Rentfrow et al., 2008 ) but such research is still scarce. In the case of regional variation in Neuroticism there is evidence that present-day Neuroticism may be associated with major historical events, such as the Industrial Revolution (Obschonka et al., 2017b) or mass societal trauma, such as the bombing campaigns of the Second World War (Obschonka et al., 2017a) .
Clearly more work is needed to understand both the causes and consequences of regional differences in Neuroticism. Future research could take a closer look, for example, at the potential interplay between the personality structure of candidates (e.g., Obschonka & Fisch, in press) and regional personality patterns. One key message of the present research is that the consequences of regional Neuroticism may remain hidden until certain conditions are met. For example, the regions that are high on Neuroticism in 2016 were likely to be high on Neuroticism during previous elections and votes too (in fact, our measurement of regional Neuroticism rested on this assumption). However, we argue that it was not until the 2016 populist campaigns were launched that the potential effects of regional Neuroticism were expressed. This finding raises the possibility that there may be other regional characteristics that have the potential to influence geopolitical events but the necessary conditions have not yet materialized.
Conclusion
Our analyses provide support for the widespread account of the appeal of the populist messages promoted by the Brexit and Trump campaigns. Consistent with the idea that populist campaigns played on the fears of the voters, those regions high in Neuroticism were more likely to vote in the populist direction. The role of regional Neuroticism in predicting voting behavior has not been identified before, suggesting that it could have been a latent factor lying dormant until the right conditions-in this case populist political campaigns-were realized. In other words, Neuroticism seems to exert a "sleeper effect" with the potential to have a profound impact on the geopolitical landscape, especially in light of the rise of populism across the globe. Ranging from 1=low to 5=high. In both countries, the personality data were collected using the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) , which consists of 44 items (5-point Likert scale, 1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) (see also Rentfrow et al., 2015) . We focus on neurotic traits, namely These data for Openness and Conscientiousness also come from the personality data sets described above.
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One potential issue of the personality data is representativeness because the data were collected via an Internet-based survey. To assess the representativeness of the region-level samples, we compared the demographic characteristics of the personality samples with data from the 2011 UK Census data and American Community Survey (2010 ACS 5yr estimates). We regarding race and education but not regarding age and gender. We also address this concern regarding the representativeness of the samples with a robustness check in which we weight the individual respondents in the personality sample -which are used for the computation of the regional neurotic traits -by age and gender. The results of this robustness check did not differ much from our main regressions (and are reported in detail in Online Appendix Table A6 ).
Note also that the personality data were collected via self-reports and were measured at a slightly different time than the voting behavior. To the extent that these factors diminished the validity of the personality estimates, the effects reported here are likely to be diminished too, so any effects should be interpreted as conservative estimates. However, indirect evidence for the validity of the personality estimates is provided by previous research undertaken at regional levels, which has shown convergence between analyses based on self-reports and informant reports (e.g., Gebauer et al., 2014) and has demonstrated reasonably strong levels of state-level stability Elleman, Condon, Russin, & Revelle, 2017; Rentfrow et al., 2013) .
Election data. We focus on two kinds of DVs. The first is the simple vote share for Brexit and Trump, testing the idea that regions high on Neuroticism were particularly likely to be swayed by populist campaigns. This DV mirrors those used in previous analyses and allows us to test whether the 2016 elections differed from previous ones in now showing associations with regional Neuroticism where previous votes had been associated only with regional Openness and Conscientiousness.
The second kind of DV, which we can measure only in the US analyses, focuses on that part of Trump's vote that is not merely due to him being the Republican candidate. In other words, we examine the shift to Trump, over and above the region's historical tendency to vote for Republican candidates. We thus aim at capturing the specific impact (and success) of Trump's populist campaign, with its clearer focus on fears and (potential) losses than seen in previous campaigns (Inglehart & Norris, 2016) . It has been suggested that it was these particular shifts to
Trump (e.g., in battlefield states) that lead to his victory (The Washington Post, 2016). Belt in the US) are in a long phase of decline (Autor, Dorn, & Hansen, 2013; Autor et al., 2017) . Third, we consider political attitudes of the regional populace. Prior research has shown that people who consider themselves as liberal tend to vote for left-wing parties and people who consider themselves as conservatives tend to vote for right-wing parties (e.g., Langer & Cohen, 2005) . So here we examine whether neurotic traits add any incremental predictive validity beyond a simple effect of political attitudes. Specifically, we include a control variable reflecting the liberal political attitude of the regional populace (single item: "I see myself as someone who is politically liberal", ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). The individual-level data come from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project in both countries and were aggregated to the corresponding regional levels in the US (M = 2.74, SD = 0.24) and UK (M = 2.97, SD = 0.21).
Fourth, the Trump and Brexit campaigns were reported to stir up racial tensions with regard to migration (e.g., Major, Blodorn, & Blascovich, 2016) and racial composition of the population can predict voting behavior (e.g. Rentfrow et al., 2015; Autor et al., 2015) . We therefore included the share of white inhabitants (US: M = 83.29%, SD = 15.24; UK M = 90.39%, SD = 12.28). Finally, we also use the educational attainment of the population as a control variable because education can also predict election results (Rentfrow et al., 2013) . We expect educational attainment to be important for two reasons. First, better educated people have profited in the last decades from free trade in terms of better job chances and higher earnings (Autor, 2014) . This makes it more likely that they will vote against Trump and Brexit, which have isolationistic tendencies. Second, populist campaigns may offer simplified solutions to complex problems and better educated people might find these simplified solutions unrealistic and thus vote against these campaigns (Seligson, 2007) . In the US, we use the population share with a bachelor degree or higher. The data come from the 2010 ACS 5yr estimates in the US (M = 21.92%, SD = 9.56). In 40 the UK, we use the population share with NVQ level 4 qualification or above, roughly equivalent to degree level. The data come from the 2011 Census (M = 26.91%, SD = 7.67).
All variables and their sources are reported in Table 1 . Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV in models 1-6: Share Brexit leave votes. The control variables are the same as in Table 4 but are suppressed due to brevity. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Tables 5 and 6 but are suppressed due to brevity. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Tables 4, 5 and 6 but are suppressed due to brevity. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
